

Author of paper :

Dr. sc. Salmedin Mesihović

Full professor for ancient and classical civilisation

Department of history and Chair of archaeology

Philosophy Faculty

University of Sarajevo

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Bato the Daesitiate, After the War

Bato Daesitiatum, post bellum

The Great Illyrian Uprising was undoubtedly one of the most important milestones in the historical development of the Roman world in terms of its significance, scope and engagement of the Roman state. This war, which Suetonius calls the most difficult of all external wars after the Punic wars (*quod grauissimum omnium externorum bellorum post Punica*)¹ lasted almost three and a half years, from the spring of 6th year AD until the late summer of 9th year AD. Despite the fact that sporadic conflicts continued in Lower Illyricum and Upper Illyricum after the autumn of the 9th year AD in the following years, they no longer had an organized character nor did they follow the idea of an insurgent alliance anymore and in time these disobedient groups would grow into ordinary bandit groups.² Therefore, the act of surrendering Bato the Daesitiate, the one who led the uprising, was the supreme leader of the insurgent army and the insurgent Alliance until the very end of the organized resistance, and according to available sources represented the "spirit of the uprising" as a formal end to this war. e.g., they were Viriathus, Aristonicus, Spartacus, Vercingetorix, Arminius, Boudica.

Cassius Dio in his "Roman History" describes the act of surrendering Bato the Daesitiate as follows: Κάν τούτω καὶ ὁ Βάτων, Σκευᾶν τὸν υἱὸν πρὸς Τιβέριον πέμψας, παραδώσειν οἱ καὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς σὺν αὐτῷ πάντας ὑπέσχετο, ἂν τῆς ἀδείας τύχη. Καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο πίστιν λαβὼν νυκτός τε ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον αὐτοῦ ἐσηλθε, καὶ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ ἐπὶ βήματος αὐτῷ καθημένῳ προσαχθεὶς ὑπὲρ μὲν ἑαυτοῦ οὐδὲν ἐδεήθη, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν προέτεινεν ὥστ' ἀποκοπῆναι, ὑπὲρ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων πολλὰ ἀπελογήσατο. Καὶ τέλος ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ Τιβερίου « τί ὑμῖν ἔδοξε

¹ Svet. Tib. 16.

² Cass. Dio. LV, 34, refers specifically to Pannonia : πλὴν καθ' ὅσον ληστικά τινα οἷα ἐκ ταραχῆς τοσαύτης ἐπὶ πλείον κακουργοῦντα διεγένετο, ὅπερ πού καὶ αἰεὶ ὡς εἰπεῖν παρὰ τε τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ παρ' ἐκείνοις μάλιστα συμβαίνει. Καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἄλλοι καθήρουν. („However, certain bands of brigand continued their forays for a long time, as was natural after so great a disturbance; indeed, this nearly always happens, not only among other peoples, but especially in the case of these tribes.“).

καὶ ἀποστῆναι καὶ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἡμῖν χρόνον ἀντιπολεμῆσαι; » ἔφη ὅτι « ὑμεῖς τούτων αἰτιοὶ ἐστε· ἐπὶ γὰρ τὰς ἀγέλας ὑμῶν φύλακας οὐ κύνας οὐδὲ νομέας ἀλλὰ λύκους πέμπετε. » ὁ μὲν οὖν πόλεμος τοῦτο τὸ τέλος ἔσχε, πολλῶν μὲν καὶ ἀνδρῶν, πλείστων δὲ δὴ καὶ χρημάτων ἀπολομένων· πάμπολλά τε γὰρ ἐς αὐτὸν στρατόπεδα ἐτράφη καὶ λεία ἐλαχίστη ἐάλω. („In the meantime Bato sent his son Sceuas to Tiberius, promising to surrender both himself and all his followers if he obtained pardon. And when he later received a pledge, he came by night to Tiberius' camp and on the following day was led before him as he sat on a tribunal. Bato asked nothing for himself, even holding his head forward to await the stroke, but in behalf of the others he made a long defence. Finally, upon being asked by Tiberius why his people had taken it into their heads to revolt and to war against the Romans so long, he replied: "You Romans are to blame for this; for you send as guardians of your flocks, not dogs or shepherds, but wolves." In this way the war was ended after the loss of many men and immense treasure; for ever so many legions were maintained for this campaign and but very little booty was taken.“).³

Although Velleius Paterculus in his draft description of the final events in the Great Illyrian Uprising does not speak of the surrender of Bato the Daesitiate, he dates the end of this "very painful war" to the summer of the 9th year AD,⁴ more precisely five days before the news of the Teutoburg catastrophe came.⁵ Velej's information about the five-day period is followed by Cassius Dio's information that the Senate passed a series of decrees awarding honorary titles and decorations to Augustus, Tiberius, Germanicus and Drusus for victory in Illyricum, and that news of the battle in Teutoburg Forest came almost immediately. Thus, by combining the above data, it could be assumed that Velleius's five-day period refers to the time between the arrival of the news of victory in Illyricum and the arrival of news of defeat in Teutoburg Forest. After all, Velleius Paterculus withdrew from the Illyrian battlefield to Rome in the autumn of the 8th year. AD, after the collapse of the organized resistance in the Pannonian Basin, and for that reason the five-day period should be viewed in terms of the arrival of news in Rome, and not the period between the actual events to which the news referred, ie the surrender of Bato the Daesitiate and destruction of Varus' army in Trans-Rhein. The difference between the date of the surrender of Bato the Daesitiate and the Teutoburg catastrophe was certainly a few days different from Velleius's mentioned five-day period, especially bearing in mind that battle in Teutoburg forest actually took

³ Cass. Dio LVI, 16

⁴ Vell. II. CXV, 1.

⁵ Vell. II, CXVII, 1 *Tantum quod ultimam imposuerat Pannonico ac Delmatico bello Caesar manum, cum intra quinque consummati tanti operis dies funesta ex Germaniae epistulae nuntium attulere caesi Vari trucidatarumque legionum trium totidemque alarum et sex cohortium, velut in hoc slatem tantummodo indulgente nobis fortuna, ne occupato duce tanta clades inferretur. Sed et causa et persona moram exigit...* („Scarcely had Caesar put the finishing touch upon the Pannonian and Dalmatian war, when, within five days of the completion of this task, dispatches from Germany brought the baleful news of the death of Varus, and of the slaughter of three legions, of as many divisions of cavalry, and of six cohorts — as though fortune were granting us this indulgence at least, that such a disaster should not be brought upon us when our commander was occupied by other wars. The cause of this defeat and the personality of the general require of me a brief digression.....”)

place over several days.⁶ It could be assumed that the beginning of the battle itself may have corresponded to the surrender of Bato the Daesitiate. Tiberius, as commander-in-chief of the Roman army in Illyricum, would have learned of the Teutoburg catastrophe at least a few more days later than the time of the news's arrival in Rome. Although there is no dating of the battle in Teutoburg forest in the literary sources available to date, some indirect data could help in at least a rough determination of the time when it took place.

Since Velleius Paterculus mentions the summer of the 9th year AD as the period of the end of war in Illyricum, and Cassius Dio in his narrative of the defeat in Teutoburg forest mentions that Varus' army was exposed to storms, with frequent and abundant, soaking rain and violent gusts of wind, it could be assumed that the surrender of Bato the Daesitiate and the battle in Teutoburg Forest took place in late summer, with the month of September as the best solution. The fact that Quintilius Varus was already preparing the army to go to winter camps in the Rhine area would also speak in favor of that. Roman offensive on the remaining insurgent area of the Adriatic Illyricum, which initially took place with advance in three directions and later with the fourth direction of penetration, began in the summer of the 9th year AD. Based on the information in the available literary sources about this last Roman offensive which finally broke the organized resistance of the insurgents and destroyed their Alliance, it can be said with a high dose of certainty that the fighting on the Adriatic-Dinaric belt took place during several months of summer 9th year AD and that the surrender of Bato the Daesitiate took place only in the last month of summer.

On the second day after the surrender, Bato the Daesitiate was brought before an investigative court presided over by Tiberius, who apparently had in Illyricum not only the supreme military, but also the civilian, including judicial, powers. Judging by the information offered by Cassius Dio, this tribunal had more of a form of hearing and an investigative court than a body to adjudicate. Apparently this was the intention of Tiberius himself, who presided over the court. He seemed to care more about informations about the causes of the uprising and the insurgents themselves, and especially about Bato the Daesitiate, than about passing verdicts and punishments. Tiberius also allowed Bato the Daesitiate to present his defense, without limiting it in any way. If Dio's concise narrative about this court is to be believed, Bato the Daesitiate did not expect such an investigative trial, but was ready for a speedy verdict and punishment. And that is why he did not pray for himself, even waiting at any moment for him to be judged and execute that eventual verdict, but he gave a long speech in favor of and in defense of his other followers. Precisely because of this model of trials and trials, Tiberius had probably already made the decision to spare Bato the Daesitiate and his followers who surrendered with him even before the tribunal was held. Bato's stance at the tribunal and his speech certainly only further underlined Tiberius' decision. Suetonius explains Tiberius' benevolent action towards Bato the Daesitiate as a form of gratitude:

⁶ About the battle in Teutoburg forest : *Ovid. Tristia*, III.12.45 – 48; *Marc. Man. Astronomica*, I, 891 – 896; *Strab. Geo.* VII, 1, 4; *Vell.* II, 117 – 120; *Sen. Min. ad Lucilium*, 47, 10; *Tac. Ann.* I, 3; 10; 43; 55 – 71; II, 7; 41; 45; 88; *Svet. Aug.* 23; *Tib.* 17 – 19; *Flor.* II, 30;

...gratiam referens, quod se quondam cum exercitu iniquitate loci circumclusum passus es[se]t evadere. (“...thus showing his gratitude to him for allowing him to escape when he was trapped with his army in a dangerous place..”) ⁷.

Suetonius gives no indication of a possible temporal or spatial determination of the encirclement of Tiberius and his army. One could only assume that this was more likely to have happened during summer offensive at 9th year AD, when the battle column under Tiberius' immediate command penetrated into the depths of the Dinaric mountain belt, which due to its hilly-mountainous character with numerous cuts, passes, canyons, river valleys, dense forests, insurgent fortified settlements, offers greater opportunities for what Suetonius calls an " dangerous place" and such a maneuvering action of the insurgents, who are also fighting on their own ground, that it can bring a much stronger opponent into difficult positions. After all, Bato the Daesitiate knew the terrain better in Adriatic than in Pannonian Illyricum. And Tiberius himself knew less about the Adriatic Illyricum than the Pannonian Illyricum, because he stayed in the latter during the Pannonian War from the 12th to the 9th years BC, and the main combat actions in the first two years of the Great Illyrian Uprising were mainly carried out in the Pannonian area. It is not impossible to even think that the mentioned situation took place during the battle for the insurgent stronghold of Andetrium⁸, shortly before the surrender of Bato the Daesitiate. There, in the first phase of the fighting, Bato the Daesitiate and Tiberius were directly confronted. Cassius Dio himself, describing the fighting and siege at Andetrium, says that Tiberius himself found himself in a difficult position when he took over the siege of this Delmatian settlement, built on a rocky hill, well fortified and difficult to access, and surrounded by deep cuts through which torrents of water flowed. The insurgents also had enough food, and the surrounding mountains were still under their control, so that, according to Dio's narrative, Tiberius, despite having a larger, better-supplied and better trained army, found himself in a situation where he himself was surrounded, in a dangerous situation, faced even with an open outburst of dissatisfaction from his own soldiers. Bato the Daesitiate, however, then sent a messenger to Tiberius to ask for a peace treaty, because he realized that, despite some pockets of resistance, the insurgent Alliance had been defeated. However, since Bato the Daesitiate could not persuade the rest of the defenders of Andretium into an agreement with Tiberius, he, probably with his followers, left Andretium and decided to hide. This information of Dio also confirms that there was communication, even negotiations, between Bato the Daesitiate and Tiberius even before the act of surrender. And this certainly had an impact on Tiberius' decision to spare and a more appropriate attitude towards the supreme leader of the insurgent Alliance. Bato the Daesitiate was neither captured nor surrendered while in a desperate situation, but voluntarily surrendered with the remaining followers while well hidden in the Illyrian wilderness, and this also brought some advantage to the fact that Tiberius had a relationship with this more benevolent relationship. Bato the Daesitiate did not go to his Daesitiate homeland, probably knowing full well that this endeavor and journey would be difficult to carry out in a

⁷ *Svet. Tib.* 20

⁸ *Andetrium*, a Dalmatian hillfort settlement and stronghold, not far from Salona.

country already well occupied by enemy military force, nor did he stray too far from the troop operations zone under Tiberius' discreet command. He seems to have correctly calculated that it would be better for him to surrender directly to Tiberius, than to Germanicus, Marcus Lepidus or Plaucius Silvanus. Of course, the possibility should not be ruled out that Tiberius was surrounded with his army in an "dangerous place" in earlier periods of the war, for example during the fighting on the northwestern battlefield near town Siscia.

From that September morning, when he surrendered, the fate of Bato the Daesitiate was in the next few years, connected with Tiberius. *Velleius Paterculus* states that Tiberius was granted the right to triumph over the Pannonians and Dalmatians, which he postponed due to war reasons (*In urbem reversus iam pridem debitum, sed continuatione bellorum dilatum ex Pannoniis Delmatisque egit triumphum*).⁹ According to Suetonius, Tiberius was granted a triumph for victory in Illyricum, but given the "people's grief" over Varus' defeat, the extraordinary new circumstances in Germany, and the much-needed haste to begin operations on the Rhine, Tiberius postponed the triumph (*Triumphum ipse distulit maesta ciuitate clade Variana*). Cassius Dio agrees with Velleius and Suetonius on this issue of granting the right to triumph (but also to Augustus and not only Tiberius) and its postponement.¹⁰ Tiberius certainly received the news of the award of the triumph, then of the Teutoburg catastrophe, and of the postponement of the triumph while he was still in Illyricum. One could assume with a high dose of probability that Bato the Daesitiate, with his son and other closest followers, was also in his immediate vicinity at the time. Tiberius could not go to the Rhine battlefield immediately after the news of the Teutoburg catastrophe arrived, because he, as an experienced and methodical military leader and general, could not leave his job unfinished. That is why he had to spend at least some more time in Illyricum in order to regulate the situation and order, and especially to control army with which he commanded in Illyricum and its regrouping, in order to transfer most of the legionary and auxiliary troops to Western Europe, as quickly and efficiently as possible. All this took some time, which Tiberius would spend either in Salona or its hinterland. When Tiberius had arranged all the affairs, and part of the units were already on their way to the Lower Rhine, Tiberius have crossed into Italy. He could not even go to the Rhine battlefield without the necessary consultations in Rome with Augustus and other prominent officials and military leaders. Tiberius' arrival in Rome was also necessary in order to raise morale among the population, which was not at an enviable height, bearing in mind that a difficult and disgusting war had just ended with little real gain, and that a new difficult war had immediately begun with one of the greatest military defeats in Roman history.

Although Tiberius postponed his triumph, he entered the city in a crimson pretext with a laurel wreath on his head as a sign of victory, but probably also with the intention of raising that shaky morale after the disaster in the Teutoburg Forest. He went to Septa on the Field of Mars, and sat there with Augustus in the middle between the two consuls. From there he greeted the people and

⁹ *Vell.* II, CXXI, 2.

¹⁰ *Cass. Dio* LVI, 17, 1; 18, 1.

went on a procession to various temples.¹¹ If Suetonius' information sequence were to be followed, this return of Tiberius to Rome would take place in the last part of the 9th year AD, for Suetonius says that the following year (and this is almost certainly 10 AD) Tiberius went to Germany again, for the war with the rebellious Germanic peoples.¹² In *Fasti Praenestine* it is mentioned that Tiberius dedicated the temple of *Concordia* in Rome, on January 16 in the consular year of *Publius Dolabella* and *Gaius Silvanus* (10 AD), when "he returned from Pannonia."¹³ The dedication of the temple may have taken place just before going to the Rhine battlefield.¹⁴

About the possible stay of Bato the Daesitiate in Rome, at this time when Tiberius also stayed in it, for now, there is no available data. One could only speculate that Tiberius took Bato the Daesitiate on his way to Italy and Rome. His eventual leaving in Illyricum would be a dangerous and unacceptable option, and sending with part of the troops to Western Europe would be pointless. In those first months after the end of the war, Tiberius considered it appropriate that his then most precious prisoner be near him, so it is probable that Bato the Daesitiate was brought to the capital of the empire against which he had revolted in the autumn or early winter.

Tiberius spent the next two and a half years as an army commander on the Rhine-German battlefield. Unlike the war in Illyricum, Tiberius devoted his stay in the Rhine-German provinces mostly to conducting defense and rehabilitation operations, without engaging in offensive actions aimed at destroying Arminius' army and re-occupying Trans-Rhein Germania. Tiberius did not seem to want to spend too much on the already strained resources of the empire, so he contented himself with repairing the damage and inflicting those blows on the opponent that would only restore the Roman name and morale to the army, but would not destroy the opponent. Tiberius' behavior on the Rhine-German battlefield in the period from 10 to 12 years AD is explained by the fact that the high intensity of engagement (both in manpower and material) of the Roman army during the three-and-a-half-year Great Illyrian Uprising contributed to the exhaustion and exhaustion of the State's capacity. The Romans were not able to adequately respond to the defeat in the Teutoburg Forest and the revolt of Germanic peoples and quell the rebellion and punish its initiators and participants, but during this period they only had to be satisfied with repairing the damage on the Rhine River. The Romans then had an armed force with which they could conduct only a successful defensive policy or less offensive actions of a partial character, and by no means to undertake wide-ranging offensive operations in a style that was, for example, launched in the rebellious Illyrian area from the 6th year AD. Tiberius, by his activity on the Rhine front, could only restore the shaken authority to the Roman army and the State, and in no way to re-establish the border on the Elbe. It was only after the death of Augustus that the Roman armed forces were

¹¹ *Svet. Tib.* 17.

¹² *Svet. Tib.* 18.

¹³ *Inscr. It.*, XIII, 2, p.114.

¹⁴ In Suetonius' narrative (*Tib.* 20), Tiberius' consecration of the temple of *Concordia*, as well as the temple of Pollux and Castor, is dated after his triumph. However, we take the view that the consecration of the temple to the goddess *Concordia* was more likely to have taken place in the year of consuls *Dolabella* and *Silvanus* than after the triumph. By the way, according to *Fasti Praenestine*, the consecration of the temple of Castor and Pollux took place on January 27.

ready and sufficiently trained for successful offensive operations of deep capture, under the command of Germanicus across the Rhine, but even then the border on river Elbe was not re-established.¹⁵

In this period from the 10th year AD (departure of Tiberius from Rome) until the second half of the 12th year AD (Tiberius' return to Italy to celebrate the triumph) it is unknown whether Bato the Daesitiate accompanied Tiberius to Gaul and Germany, or was in some kind of detention in Rome or its environs awaiting Tiberius' triumph in Illyricum. Bato the Daesitiate reappears in sources only with a triumphal procession, which was held (according *Fasti Praenestina*) on October 23, 12 AD.¹⁶ Ovid in a letter addressed to Germanicus, describing Tiberius' triumph, also mentions Bato the Daesitiate : 45 *maxima pars horum vitam veniamque tulerunt, / in quibus et belli summa caputque Bato. / cur ego posse negem minui mihi numinis iram, / cum videam mitis hostibus esse deos?* ("And so many captive chieftains, chained by the neck, / they were almost enough to form an enemy host. / Most of them were granted life and pardon, / among them Bato, high chieftain of the war. / Why should I fail to believe the divine anger could lessen / towards me, when I see the gods merciful to an enemy?").

Ovid says that many captured insurgent leaders were carried out in a triumphal procession, including Bato, the chief leader of the war, and that most of them, including Bato the Daesitiate, were given life and forgiveness. Suetonius also mentions that Tiberius endowed Bato the Daesitiate with rich rewards and determined his residence in Ravenna (*Batonem Pannonium ducem ingentibus donatum praemiis Rauennam transtulit*). Bato the Daesitiate's stay in Ravenna was not a captivity, but an internment, and the gifts and wealth he received from Tiberius allowed him a relatively luxurious and comfortable stay in Italy. He was probably forbidden to return to Illyricum voluntarily. Ravenna otherwise served Tiberius as a place of internment or to house high-ranking prisoners and defecting individuals who were leaders or only belonged to authoritative and respectable families and clans of other nations. Thus Tiberius placed in Ravenna the captured wife of Arminius called **Thusnelda** and their son Thumelicus, who were sent there after being carried out in Germanicus' triumph held on May 26, 17 AD and the fugitive Marcomannian king **Maroboudus**, who received a "safe and honorable refuge" in this Italian city in 19th AD.¹⁷ According to Tacitus, **Maroboudus** did not leave Italy for 18 years, where he led a comfortable and luxurious life.¹⁸ It is not impossible to assume that Bato the Daesitiate and **Maroboudus**, and

¹⁵ Judging by the activities on the Rhine during the campaign of 10-12 years AD, Tiberius seems to have given up on Trans-Germania as a useless country, quite distant from the world of the Mediterranean and its civilization, and did not want to spend too much of the State's already spent resources on it. And this shows his tendency to tact, as well as a certain hesitation and caution to take radical and decisive moves, all of which eventually culminated in his retreat to Capri and ultimately as the ultimate consequence of his rule of Sejanus' conspiracy.

¹⁶ Description of Tiberius' triumph is given by Ovid (*Ex Ponto*, II, I (*Germanico*), 1 - 68 :) Suetonius (*Tib.* 20); *cameo Gemma Augustea*; skyphos from the Boscoreale treasury; coins (aureus and denars) issued in the 13th or 14th year AD in the mints of Rome and Lugdunum.

¹⁷ *Str. Geo.* VII, 1, 4, C 292; *Tac. Ann.* I, 55 – 59. In *Augustus, Res Gestae*, V, 32 mentions a list of kings who, for various reasons, crossed or fled or were interned in Roman territory. There is no name of Bato the Daesitiate in it, perhaps because he was previously a Roman subject and also because he was not even a king.

¹⁸ *Vell.* II, CXXIX, 3; *Tac. Ann.* II, 62 – 63; III, 11

even Arminius's wife Thusnelda, met in this Italian city. By the way, Bato the Daesitiate was certainly closer to **Maroboudus** in terms of age, whom he saved from an almost certain defeat when he prevented Tiberius from completing the conquest of Marcomannia in the 6th year AD by raising an uprising of recruited Illyrian young men.

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